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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature Of The Case 
 
 Tricia Franklin appeals from her judgment of conviction for felony DUI. 
 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
 
 On February 6, 2013, at about 10:12 p.m., Boise County Deputy Tatalian 
received a call from dispatch to respond to an accident scene in Boise County on 
the Banks-Lowman highway.  (R., p. 79.)  He was at that time off duty and at his 
home in Boise, Ada County, and he did not arrive at the accident scene until 
about 10:47.  (Id.)  Fire department personnel informed him that they had treated 
an injured female, the only person they had found at the scene, and that she had 
been transported to a hospital in Boise.  (R., p. 80.)   
Deputy Tatalian had encountered the truck involved in the accident earlier 
that evening in relation to a report of an intoxicated driver.  (R., pp. 79-80.)  He 
found the vehicle, parked at the time at the Wander Inn in Crouch, and made 
contact with Franklin and her boyfriend, Jason Snowball, at one of the rooms in 
the inn.  (R., p. 80.)  Because they appeared to be intoxicated, he instructed 
them to not drive again that evening.  (Id.)  Based on this earlier encounter, 
Deputy Tatalian concluded that the female treated and then taken from the scene 
was likely Franklin.  (Id.)  However, he also found Snowball’s wallet at the scene.  
(Id.)  Unsure who had been driving at the time of the accident and wanting to 
confirm that Snowball was not in need of medical assistance, Deputy Tatalian 
returned to the Wander Inn, where he was able to contact Snowball, who was 
apparently asleep and not involved in the accident.  (Id.) 
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Deputy Tatalian contacted a phlebotomist in Boise and arranged for 
another deputy to meet her at the hospital where Franklin had been taken.  (R., 
pp. 80-81.)  The phlebotomist and Deputy Rogers contacted Franklin, who was 
“uncooperative and objected to the blood draw.”  (R., p. 81.)  The phlebotomist 
handed sample tubes from the DUI kit to a nurse who was already drawing blood 
for medical purposes; the nurse filled the tubes and handed the tubes to the 
phlebotomist, who in turn handed the tubes to Deputy Rogers.  (Id.)  The blood 
test resulted in a blood alcohol content measurement of 0.236 percent.  (State’s 
Exhibit 1.) 
The state charged Franklin with felony DUI and driving without privileges.  
(R., pp. 19-21.)  Franklin filed a motion to suppress, among other things, the 
results of the blood tests.  (R., pp. 25-27.)  The district court resolved one 
contested fact by finding that Deputy Tatalian contacted Deputy Rogers and 
arranged for the blood draw “at about 12:20 a.m. to 12:30 a.m. in the early 
morning hours of February 7, 2013.”  (R., pp. 80-81.) 
Based on its factual findings, the district court denied the motion to 
suppress on two grounds.  First, the court determined that the blood draw was 
justified by implied consent.  (R., pp. 81-85.)  Second, the court found the search 
justified by exigent circumstances.  (R., pp. 85-87.) 
Franklin entered a conditional guilty plea to felony DUI, preserving her 
right to appeal the denial of her suppression motion, and the state dismissed the 
driving without privileges charge.  (R., p. 120.)  The district court entered 
judgment and Franklin filed a timely notice of appeal.  (R., pp. 130, 137.) 
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ISSUE 
 
 Franklin states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err when it denied Ms. Franklin’s motion to 
suppress? 
 
 (Appellant’s brief, p. 7.) 
 
 The state rephrases the issue as: 
 
 Has Franklin failed to show error in the denial of her motion to suppress 
where she failed to show any search occurred under the Fourth Amendment and 
where exigent circumstances justified a warrantless blood draw? 
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ARGUMENT 
 
Franklin Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of Her Motion To Suppress 
Where She Failed To Show Any Search Occurred Under The Fourth Amendment 
And Where Exigent Circumstances Justified A Warrantless Blood Draw 
 
A. Introduction 
 
 The district court denied Franklin’s suppression motion, finding that the 
blood draw was justified under implied consent and exigent circumstances.  (R., 
pp. 78-88.)  The state concedes that recent Idaho Supreme Court decisions 
holding that implied consent may be revoked renders the implied consent 
exception inapplicable under the facts of this case.  Franklin has, however, failed 
to show error in the district court’s exigent circumstances analysis.  Moreover, 
the district court’s order denying the motion to suppress may also be affirmed on 
the basis that Franklin failed to prove that a search protected by the Fourth 
Amendment occurred when a nurse already drawing blood for medical purposes 
merely filled additional sample tubes for law enforcement use. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
“The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a 
decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court’s 
findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but we freely review 
the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found.”  State v. Colvin, 
157 Idaho 881, 882, 341 P.3d 598, 599 (Ct. App. 2014). 
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C. Franklin Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court’s Determination 
That Exigent Circumstances Justified A Warrantless Blood Draw 
 
 “[W]arrants are generally required to search a person’s home or his 
person unless ‘the exigencies of the situation’ make the needs of law 
enforcement so compelling that the warrantless search is objectively reasonable 
under the Fourth Amendment.”  Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393-94 (1978).  
Such exigencies include the “imminent risk of destruction of evidence.”  State v. 
Robinson, 144 Idaho 496, 499, 163 P.3d 1208, 1211 (Ct. App. 2007).  “To 
determine whether a law enforcement officer faced an emergency that justified 
acting without a warrant, this Court looks to the totality of circumstances.”  
Missouri v. McNeely, ___ U.S. ___, 133 S.Ct. 1552, 1559 (2013).  In Schmerber 
v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 768-69 (1966), the Supreme Court of the United 
States found the following totality of the circumstances to justify a warrantless 
blood draw because of exigent circumstances: 
Here, there was plainly probable cause for the officer to arrest 
petitioner and charge him with driving an automobile while under 
the influence of intoxicating liquor. The police officer who arrived at 
the scene shortly after the accident smelled liquor on petitioner’s 
breath, and testified that petitioner’s eyes were ‘bloodshot, watery, 
sort of a glassy appearance.’ The officer saw petitioner again at the 
hospital, within two hours of the accident. There he noticed similar 
symptoms of drunkenness. He thereupon informed petitioner ‘that 
he was under arrest and that he was entitled to the services of an 
attorney, and that he could remain silent, and that anything that he 
told me would be used against him in evidence.’ 
 
(Footnote omitted.) 
 The accident in this case occurred before 10:12 p.m.  (R., p. 79.)  Deputy 
Tatalian, who was off duty and at home in Boise at the time, received the call 
from dispatch regarding the accident at about 10:12 p.m.  (R., p. 79.)  He arrived 
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at the scene at about 10:47 p.m.  (R., p. 79.)  Franklin had been transported from 
the scene before Deputy Tatalian arrived.  (R., pp. 79-80.)  Deputy Tatalian 
investigated who the driver of the vehicle had been, confirmed that Mr. Snowball 
was not involved, and then, at about 12:20 or 12:30 a.m. contacted, through 
dispatch, another deputy to conduct a blood draw on Franklin in Boise.  (R., pp. 
80-81.)  The blood draw was accomplished at about 12:40 a.m.  (R., p. 81.) 
 The district court considered the totality of the circumstances and 
concluded that Deputy Tatalian did not complete his investigation until almost two 
hours after the accident.  (R., p. 86.)  Seeking a warrant would have created a 
“total delay of at least two (2) to three (3) hours.”  (R., p. 86.)  Because of the 
metabolism of alcohol, “the additional time it would have taken to obtain a 
warrant would likely have resulted in such a delay as to potentially deprive the 
state of important evidence of alcohol concentration.”  (R., pp. 86-87.)  The 
district court correctly applied the law to the facts and concluded it was 
reasonable to proceed without seeking a search warrant under the totality of the 
circumstances.  
 Franklin argues the district court’s factual finding that Deputy Tatalian 
requested the blood draw at about midnight was clearly erroneous.  (Appellant’s 
brief, pp. 16-17.)  This argument fails for several reasons.  First, Franklin’s claim 
the finding does not rely on “competent” evidence (Appellant’s brief, p. 16) is 
fatuous because the district court relied on the testimony presented at a hearing.  
Second, her claim that the factual findings “entirely disregard the testimony of 
Ms. Schaadt” (Appellant’s brief, p. 16) is directly contrary to the record (R., p. 81 
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(specifically summarizing the testimony of Ms. Schaadt, explaining that there was 
“some inconsistency in evidence,” and resolving that inconsistency).)  Third, her 
reliance on “the dispatch records” (Appellant’s brief, p. 16) is mystifying because 
although there were some questions based on dispatch records1 no such records 
were admitted into evidence (see State’s Exhibit 1, Defense Exhibit A).  The 
record shows that the district court’s finding that Deputy Tatalian requested the 
blood draw after midnight was based on its resolution of “some inconsistency in 
the evidence” (R., p. 81), a matter within its province.  Franklin has failed to show 
clear error in the court’s factual finding. 
 Perhaps most importantly, however, Franklin has failed to articulate how a 
finding of fact that Deputy Tatalian first contacted dispatch about securing a 
                                            
1 Franklin claims the following: “[A]ccording to the dispatch log, Deputy Tatalian 
contacted dispatch, by way of radio at 11:17 p.m. ‘to seek a phlebotomist and 
officer to accomplish a blood draw’ on Ms. Franklin.  (12/26/13 Tr., p.14, L.22 – 
p.15, p. [sic] 7.)”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 16.)  This is not an accurate summation of 
the evidence. The cited portion of the transcript, read verbatim, is as follows: 
 
 Q At some point did you, by way of radio, contact your 
dispatch in Boise County to seek a phlebotomist and officer to 
accomplish a blood draw? 
 A I did. 
 Q Do you recall what time that was? 
 A I don’t recall a specific time off the top of my head, no. 
 Q If the dispatch log indicates 11:17, would that be 
accurate? 
 A It would be within a minute or two of me calling, yes. 
 
(12/26/13 Tr., p. 14, L. 22 – p. 15, L. 7.)  The testimony was that the dispatch 
logs would, within a minute or two, accurately reflect when Deputy Tatalian 
called. (12/26/13 Tr., p. 15, Ls. 4-7.)  Thus, the time of the call would be 11:17 
only “[i]f the dispatch log [so] indicates.”  (12/26/13 Tr., p. 15, L. 4.)  The dispatch 
logs were never admitted into evidence.  (See Exhibits.)  Therefore, the evidence 
does not require a factual finding that the logs did establish a call at 11:17 as 
asserted by Franklin. 
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phlebotomist and another officer to conduct a blood draw would have changed 
the outcome of the exigent circumstances analysis.  He merely assumes that 
Deputy Tatalian’s initial contact with dispatch to arrange for a phlebotomist and 
other officer to conduct a blood draw meant he “had decided that he could arrest 
Ms. Franklin for DUI and [therefore] had ample time and ability to seek a 
warrant.”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 19.)  It is actually Franklin’s assumption that lacks 
an evidentiary basis.  Even if this Court were to conclude that dispatch was 
initially contacted at 11:15 regarding getting a blood draw, there is no basis to 
conclude that such contact came after, as opposed to during, Deputy Tatalian’s 
investigation.     
The relevant inquiry is not when Deputy Tatalian started making 
arrangements for the blood draw but whether seeking a warrant after he had 
conducted his investigation and obtained probable cause would have resulted in 
a loss of evidence.  The district court did not even mention in its analysis of 
exigent circumstances when Deputy Tatalian first contacted dispatch about 
arranging the blood draw, but instead relied heavily on the finding that Deputy 
Tatalian completed his investigation by confirming that Snowball was not the 
driver (and not involved in the accident) at around midnight.  (R., pp. 85-87.)  
Franklin has cited no evidence (other than conflicting evidence suggesting he 
first requested dispatch to secure a phlebotomist and an officer to conduct a 
blood test) that Deputy Tatalian had finished his investigation by 11:15 and was 
therefore merely wasting his time for the next 45 minutes or so.  Because 
Franklin is merely requesting this Court to make unwarranted leaps of logic from 
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his claim of a clearly erroneous factual finding, Franklin has failed to show error 
even if the factual finding about when Deputy Tatalian first broached the subject 
of securing a phlebotomist and another officer with dispatch was clearly 
erroneous. 
     Franklin next argues that the district court clearly erred by finding: “that it 
would have taken at least two to three hours to obtain a warrant for the blood 
draw.”  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 17-18.)  This argument relies on the district court’s 
statement that “there are exigent circumstances where, as here, law enforcement 
cannot obtain a blood sample in a DUI investigation for between two (2) and 
three (3) hours after developing probable cause to secure a warrant.”  (R., p. 87.)  
In context it is clear that the court was not finding that the warrant process itself 
was two to three hours long, but rather referring to obtaining the sample two to 
three hours after the crash.  Earlier in the same paragraph the court found that 
the “total delay,” including the investigation and obtaining a search warrant, 
would have been “at least two (2) to three (3) hours.”  (R., p. 86.)  The district 
court’s analysis was plainly that adding more time to obtain a search warrant to 
the nearly two hours that had already passed during the investigation would 
merely create too great a risk of loss of evidence.  (R., pp. 86-87; compare with 
Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 768-69 (two hour investigation central to exigency 
determination).  Franklin has failed to show error. 
 The district court concluded that exigent circumstances justified the 
warrantless blood draw because the total time of the investigation plus obtaining 
a search warrant would have been about two to three hours, creating a 
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substantial risk of loss of evidence of Franklin’s true BAC percentage.  (R., pp. 
86-87.)  Franklin’s argument that the investigation was in fact done in about an 
hour is contrary to the district court’s factual findings and, ultimately, the evidence 
presented.  Franklin has therefore failed to show error in the district court’s denial 
of the motion to suppress. 
 
D. Franklin Failed To Show That Police Obtained Her Blood By A Search 
Under The Fourth Amendment 
 
 The Fourth Amendment does not apply “absent some action taken by 
government agents that can properly be classified as a ‘search’ or a ‘seizure.’”  
Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 468-69 (1985); see also United States v. 
Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113-14 (1984) (Fourth Amendment only applies to 
governmental action, not actions of those who are not government agents); 
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 487 (1971) (wife’s actions within 
scope of Fourth Amendment only if she “acted as an ‘instrument’ or agent of the 
state when she produced her husband’s belongings”); Georgia v. Randolph, 547 
U.S. 103, 146 (2006) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Under this Court’s precedents, 
only the action of an agent of the government can constitute a search within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment ….”).  It is “firmly established” that the Fourth 
Amendment is not violated by private searches.  State v. Kopsa, 126 Idaho 512, 
517, 887 P.2d 57, 62 (Ct. App. 1994).   
The search and seizure in this case was the “intrusion[] into [Franklin’s] 
body.”  Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 769; see also State v. Holton, 132 Idaho 501, 
503, 975 P.2d 789, 791 (1998).  That intrusion was accomplished in this case by 
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a hospital nurse for medical purposes.  (R., p. 81.)  The only state action in 
obtaining the blood was to ask the nurse to obtain more blood than she otherwise 
would have, which did not involve any additional intrusion into Franklin’s body.  
Because there was no search or seizure under the facts of this case, the district 
court should be affirmed on this basis.  See McKinney v. State, 133 Idaho 695, 
700, 992 P.2d 144, 149 (1999) (correct ruling will be affirmed on the correct legal 
theory); State v. Avelar, 129 Idaho 700, 704, 931 P.2d 1218, 1222 (1997); see 
also State v. Rhoades, 134 Idaho 862, 864, 11 P.3d 481, 483 (2000).    
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court’s 
judgment. 
 DATED this 9th day of March, 2016. 
 
 
 
      /s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen____________ 
      KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
      Deputy Attorney General 
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